Category: Recent Cases

The Court set aside a decision refusing a claim based on a finding of adequate state protection. The Court held that the tribunal failed to consider all of the evidence and the efforts to obtain protection in the past.

The Court upheld a finding that the applicant was inadmissible. The Court upheld the finding that the plan to ensure the applicant would not impose a burden on social services was inadequate.

The Court held that the transcript of the previous proceedings was not reliable and hence could not be used as evidence unless Mr. Jaballah testified and then only to impugn his credibility.

The Court set aside a finding of the visa officer that the applicant was inadmissible on security grounds. The Court found that the evidence which included secret evidence not disclosed to the applicant did not meet the reasonable grounds threshold and that the inferences of the officer were unreasonable.

The Court found that the reasons were sufficient to sustain the negative finding. The Judge mentioned the gaps in the documents. There was no allegation that the judge failed to consider all of the evidence

The Court set aside a PRRA noting: [13] While an officer is entitled to weigh the evidence and need not cite all of it in the reasons for decision, he or she cannot base a decision on a selective review of the evidence. Where there is credible evidence supporting the opposite of the officer’s conclusion, he or she must refer to it and explain why it can be discounted (Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] F.C.J. No. 1425).

The Court set aside the refusal to grant an adjournment to unrepresented counsel: [18] According to the decision in Chohan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 390 at para. 13, the RPD is obliged to consider a request for an adjournment in a “principled way” having regard to the factors identified in section 48 of the RPD Rules. [19] In the present case, the only rationale for refusing the Applicant’s request for a postponement of the hearing is contained in an entry in the Tribunal Record as follows: Counsel agreed on Jan 27/09 to this date. Moreover, video has been set up already. [20] In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that the RPD committed a reviewable error in refusing the request by Counsel, on behalf of the Applicant for an adjournment, thereby compromising his ability to fully prepare to present his case.

The Court set aside the refusal of an H & C application holding that the officer erred by ignoring the evidence of similarly situated people when assessing risk: [33] In my view, the officer in the present case failed to properly analyze the evidence about Mrs. Mujib’s family who appear to be similarly situated individuals and who were granted protection. This evidence was put forward by the applicants.

The Court set aside a decision where the Member actively discouraged a corroborative witness. The tribunal found against the applicant on grounds of credibility. The court found a breach of natural justice noting: I agree with counsel for the Respondent that the IAD has the right to limit repetitive testimony, but not by effectively excluding witnesses who could offer evidence going to the central issues of the case. The place to control excessive or repetitive evidence on issues of controversy which are central or determinative is generally not at the entrance to the witness box, but once the witness is testifying – and even then the member must grant some latitude to ensure that all important matters are covered. The IAD can, of course, limit the scope of evidence by stipulating certain points that are not in dispute. In a case like this one where the credibility of the Applicant is clearly in issue and where the genuineness of a marriage is in doubt, the evidence of immediate family and close acquaintances is highly relevant and should be heard without reservation. Indeed, it is difficult to see how a matter such as this could be fairly determined after only two hours of evidence, particularly where Mr. Kamtasingh was self-represented and was initially intending to lead evidence from several witnesses. This was a situation where the duty to allow Mr. Kamtasingh to fully present his case was sacrificed for the desire for administrative efficiency. That is not a permissible trade-off:

The Court set aside a decision where the IRB declared a claim abandoned. The claimant had filed an affidavit in which he set out that he had provided a change of address. The Court found that the failure of the tribunal to consider the affidavit was reviewable error.