Category: Credibility

The Court set aside a decision finding that all of the credibility findings were unreasonable. The Court noted that the refusal to accept the applicant's explanation was not reasonable as was its refusal to provide any weight to the medical letter.

The Court set aside a finding of the visa officer that the applicant was inadmissible on security grounds. The Court found that the evidence which included secret evidence not disclosed to the applicant did not meet the reasonable grounds threshold and that the inferences of the officer were unreasonable.

The Court set aside a decision where the Member actively discouraged a corroborative witness. The tribunal found against the applicant on grounds of credibility. The court found a breach of natural justice noting: I agree with counsel for the Respondent that the IAD has the right to limit repetitive testimony, but not by effectively excluding witnesses who could offer evidence going to the central issues of the case. The place to control excessive or repetitive evidence on issues of controversy which are central or determinative is generally not at the entrance to the witness box, but once the witness is testifying – and even then the member must grant some latitude to ensure that all important matters are covered. The IAD can, of course, limit the scope of evidence by stipulating certain points that are not in dispute. In a case like this one where the credibility of the Applicant is clearly in issue and where the genuineness of a marriage is in doubt, the evidence of immediate family and close acquaintances is highly relevant and should be heard without reservation. Indeed, it is difficult to see how a matter such as this could be fairly determined after only two hours of evidence, particularly where Mr. Kamtasingh was self-represented and was initially intending to lead evidence from several witnesses. This was a situation where the duty to allow Mr. Kamtasingh to fully present his case was sacrificed for the desire for administrative efficiency. That is not a permissible trade-off:

The Court set aside a finding of lack of credibility noting: [8] It has been long established, however, that findings of fact based on speculation are inherently unreasonable. The key facts found in this case fall within the realm of speculation. They were not reasonable inferences drawn from established facts.

The Court set aside a decision of the Refugee Division. The tribunal disbelieved the evidence of the applicant concluding that her evidence was inconsistent with the documentary evidence. The evidence in question was from the internet of unknown reliability and did not support the inferences. The Court set aside the decision

The court set aside a credibility finding noting: 'The Board’s credibility determination is based on erroneous implausibility findings and on peripheral inconsistencies while implicitly accepting, or not questioning, the central elements of the Applicant’s refugee claim."

The Court set aside a decision rejecting a claim based on credibility findings. The Court found that the findings were unreasonable as they were based on speculation.

The Court set aside a decision on credibility because the Board erred by reviewing the evidence microscopically.

The Court set aside a decision which rejected a claim on credibility holding that the tribunal ought not to review the evidence microscopically.

The Court set aside a negative credibility finding because it did not take into account cultural differences.